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Thresholds in asset accumulation dynamics can drive a wedge between households able to pursue
relatively high-return, asset-based economic activities and those forced into lower return alternatives.
While some evidence has been found for such thresholds amongst pastoralist communities in the arid
and semi-arid rangelands of northern Kenya, relatively less is known about the mechanisms behind
such poverty trap phenomena. The setting is particularly suitable for such a study because there
is one primary high-return livelihood, mobile pastoralism, based on a scalar primary asset stock,
livestock. Sustainable pastoralism involves livestock movements in response to the bimodal rainfall
distribution. I develop and provide empirical tests for the implications of a simple model capturing
the idea that the bifurcation in asset dynamics is driven by a threshold in the incentive to engage in
mobile pastoralism. Additional evidence is presented regarding pastoralist movement patterns. Data
collected on pastoralist concerns allows us to look at the e⁄ect of subjective beliefs on subsequent
mobility and movement behavior.1 Introduction
The question of whether individuals or households can end of up structurally trapped in poverty is
central to our understanding of poverty and what to do about it. If people ￿nd themselves in such
traps they can dictate welfare dynamics, which can persist into the future if households are mired
in a low-returns trap that prevents investing in the future, including through education. If people
can ￿nd themselves mired in structural poverty due primarily to historical reasons or bad luck, this
provides strong justi￿cation for policies meant to move people out of such traps, and to provide
bu⁄ers against others falling in. A strand of the theoretical literature suggests the possibility of such
traps. The general approach is to posit a key input or asset that is critical for individual productivity,
such a nutrition (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986), human capital (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Galor and
Zeira, 1993), or physical capital (Banerjee and Newman, 1993), and provide a mechanism, such as
borrowing constraints or externalities, that leads to a signi￿cant number of individuals having a
suboptimally low allocation of the key input.
The growing empirical literature that has emerged to test for poverty traps, often based on try-
ing to ￿nd a non-linearity in household income, expenditure, or asset dynamics through various
techniques and data con￿gurations, has found mixed results. One setting in which we ￿nd quite
robust evidence for asset poverty traps is in the pastoral rangelands of east Africa, in which empir-
ical inference is simpli￿ed because there is a singular, higher-return, asset-based livelihood, mobile
pastoralism (Lybbert et al., 2004; Barrett et al., 2006). Far less evidence, however, exists on the
particular mechanisms that might drive non-linearities in asset dynamics, which is needed to better
characterize such thresholds, and critical for policy design in response to apparent poverty traps.
Little et al. (2008) suggest that the bifurcation in asset dynamics is due to the nature of mobile
pastoralism, which is the primary risk-management tool employed by pastoralists in response to
variable rainfall conditions. This potential break point in long-run incentives to engage in active
asset accumulation corresponds to the ￿ Micawber threshold￿in this setting (Zimmerman and Carter,
2003; Carter and Barrett, 2006).1 In this paper I build on evidence of non-linear asset dynamics
in the pastoral rangelands of northern Kenya, specifying and testing a model capturing the idea
that a bifurcation in asset accumulation dynamics is driven by the opportunity costs and incentives
resulting from the mobile pastoralism livelihood in comparison to the sedentary alternative.
In Kenya alone, government statistics indicate that pastoral areas occupy at least 80 percent of
the land mass, home to about 10 million people and 90 percent of the country￿ s wildlife (Irinnews,
2007). It is crucial to understand how the sustainability of the mobile pastoralism livelihood can
1Poverty rates in this population are much higher amongst those who have "fallen out" and don￿ t have the option
of engaging in mobile pastoralism (Little et al., 2008).
1be maintained in the face of current challenges, including climate change, security risks, increased
competition for scarce land, water and other resources, and shifting prices for animal-based products.
Poverty rates are much higher amongst those who have "fallen out" and don￿ t have the option of
engaging in mobile pastoralism (Little et al., 2008). A key question is whether those who have moved
out of mobile pastoralism have fallen into a structural poverty trap, and what mechanisms might
be driving such state. In addition, it is important to understand movement and herd accumulation
choices. Pastoralist grazing patterns have caused tremendous environmental degradation in the
region, including spurring on deserti￿cation (McPeak, 2003), while herd mobility can lead to violent
inter-tribal con￿ ict, given that property rights over waterpoints and grazing lands are not clearly
delineated between rival tribes.
While most papers modeling non-convexities in asset dynamics make use of some kind of ￿xed,
indivisible cost of entering the asset-intensive, higher-return livelihood (which the individual is con-
strained from meeting, perhaps due to credit market failures), the posited mechanism here is slightly
di⁄erent. Instead of an entry cost, I hypothesize three context-speci￿c factors. First, mobile pas-
toralism requires a signi￿cant commitment of resources, as su¢ cient household herding labor must
be committed during biannual dry seasons, which last 2-4 months. In practice, presumably due
to weak contracting frictions and social norms, households take responsibility for their own herds,
setting up remote ￿ satellite camps￿for the mobile herd, leaving behind su¢ cient lactating herd re-
sources in the village to provide consumption for female, transhumant and very young members of
household. Hence household labor is pulled away from remunerative activities in the central town,
however limited they are,2 and dedicated exclusively to animal herding for a signi￿cant portion of
the year. Clearly for a minimal level of village earnings possibilities, there will be a minimal herd
size necessary for mobile pastoralism to be optimal. Second, herd growth rates di⁄er between mobile
pastoralism, which generally exposes animals to higher-quality forage resources (in spite of increased
activity from movement) and sedentarism, and biology dictates that herd growth by reproduction
is di¢ cult at low herd sizes. This again points to low returns to mobile pastoralism at small herd
sizes. Finally, such poor households in a location with shaky social protections face a prominent
subsistence consumption threshold, and risk concerns only intensify the preference of households for
a more certain stream of returns. These factors together can generate a bifurcation in the incentive
to engage in mobile pastoralism. Notice that the lack of credit markets can still be important here￿
households could in principle borrow a large enough sum of money in order to move their herd size
signi￿cantly beyond the threshold. Yet it is still the case that the poverty is not driven directly by
a large, ￿xed cost of entry into the higher-return livelihood.
2Sedentarisation with a small herd implies dire poverty in this context, as there are few nonpastoral options available
to stockless pastoralists, the vast majority of whom are illiterate (Desta, 1999; McPeak and Little, 2004).
2The primary tool employed for the identi￿cation of a bifurcation in incentives to pursue mobile
pastoralism is a semiparametric panel estimator, implemented through cubic splines, that allows for a
￿ exible speci￿cation of the relationship between (labor-adjusted) herd size and a household￿ s propen-
sity to pursue mobile pastoralism.3 The empirical model is based on a generalized additive model
framework, which has the advantage of allowing the analyst to additionally control for observable
heterogeneity amongst herder households through linear covariates, and for unobservable heterogene-
ity through ￿xed or random e⁄ects. Analogous techniques have been employed by Naschold (2008)
to attempt to ￿ exibly identify bifurcation thresholds in asset accumulation dynamics while simulta-
neously controlling for linear covariates. I provide a number of additional sources of evidence on the
threshold result, and a number of robustness checks. In addition, some more recent work in this area
has moved beyond the identi￿cation of thresholds averaged across the population, into exploring the
role of heterogeneity in asset dynamics and livelihood options. Santos and Barrett (2006), exploit-
ing data on pastoral livelihoods in southern Ethiopia, extract a measure of ability in pastoralism,
and show that asset dynamics can vary greatly in ability. Following Santos and Barrett (2006) I
extract a measure of pastoral ability based on observed herd growth performance, and incorporate
this additional measure into the threshold analysis. This provides evidence on a potential tradeo⁄
in mobility between herd size and underlying ability. The move from one to two-dimensions also
provides a simple demonstration of how such semiparametric techniques might be useful in study
potential poverty trap phenomena in settings where the asset vector is naturally higher-dimensional.
In addition to directly looking at the relationship between herd size per capita and mobility
status, I study the in￿ uence of other factors on mobility patterns. This includes characteristics
of the household and household head, such as age, education, and household labor structure. In
addition, data collected on concerns of herders about future events such as lack of water resources or
con￿ ict allow me to provide evidence on the in￿ uence of subjective beliefs on mobility and movement
patterns. I then provide additional evidence on household movement patterns, using mobility as a
selection condition to identify the set of mobile households. I look at frequency of herd movements,
two measures of time spent at remote waterpoints, and maximum distance moved, as dependent
variables.
3It is natural in the empirical analysis to model the propensity to engage in mobile pastoralism as the dependent
variable, and herd size as an explanatory variable, as in the short-run herd size is roughly ￿xed, while mobility is a free
choice. However, in the long-run the causality switches￿ the decision to engage in mobile pastoralism determines the
evolution of the herd stock. This implies that an estimated threshold in asset dynamics is probably biased downwards,
and so for example for policy implications in an area like herd-stocking, we should probably take the threshold estimate
as an absolute lower bound.
31.1 S-Shaped Asset Accumulation Dynamics and Poverty Traps in East
African Pastoralism
Lybbert et al. (2004) and Barrett et al. (2006) use a nonparametric kernel approach to identify
S-shaped asset accumulation dynamics, using data from pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, and rural
Kenya (covering two common research sites with this paper), respectively. Their results provide
important motivation for the application in this paper, by pointing to a bifurcation in asset accumu-
lation dynamics in rural pastoralism. The graphs give a measure of household herd size in a ￿xed
period on the x-axis, and the subsequent value of the measure in the next period. In both ￿gures the
animal stock is indexed in terms of tropical livestock units (TLU),4 while in the latter ￿gure herd
size is normalized by a measure of household size (I also adopt the per capita measure of herd size).
The points where the graphs cross the 45-degree line with a slope greater than the 45-degree line
indicate unstable dynamic asset equilibria, while those with slope less than the 45-degree line indicate
stable dynamic asset equilibria. Values of the graph below the 45-degree line are decumulation zones:
on average, herder assets should be decreasing within these zones. Values above the 45-degree line
correspond to accumulation zones.
Figure 1. Herd dynamics Lybbert et al.
(2004). Figure 2. Herd dynamics Barrett et al. (2006).
The graph in Figure 1 is particularly useful, as it presents the (expected) asset accumulation
regimes explicitly. In such a growth diagram we see where the asset accumulation threshold exists,
4TLU is the standard livestock asset index in the literature, where 1 TLU = 1 cow = 0.7 camels = 10 sheep or
goats.
4at around 2.2 (in log terms; that is, about exp(2:2) = 9.03 TLU). Above the threshold herders
are expected to increase their herd stock back to a more sustainable threshold, here around 4.2 (in
log terms; exp(4:2) = 66.69), while below they are expected to converge to the low-level sedentary
activity, which here is around 1 TLU. Hence both diagrams seem to be indicative of critical thresholds
in asset accumulation dynamics. Finally, the ￿gure from Barrett et al. (2006)
With this context, then, the key research question here can be stated as: what are the mechanisms
driving the bifurcation in asset accumulation dynamics in terms of livelihood patterns?
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of pastoralist mobility and herd
asset accumulation choices, which frames the research hypotheses, including the threshold e⁄ects in
mobility. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategies employed in the paper. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 presents results and robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes. Supplementary
material is presented in the Appendices A-C.
2 A Model of Pastoralist Choice Over Mobility and Herd
Asset Accumulation
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the mobility and movement choices of individual
pastoralist households. In this section I outline a relatively simple model that illustrates the salient
aspects of the choice problem of an individual household, from which I derive the primary empirical
hypotheses that will be tested in later sections. In the model each household faces the discrete choice
between engaging in mobile pastoralism or the alternative, sedentary livelihood. The vast majority
of households engaged in mobile pastoralism in the dataset are not nomadic but rather migratory￿ a
central base camp is maintained year-around, which will permanently include female, transhumant
and very young members of household. During the dry season, male household members, older
children and teenagers form the labor force that tends to the herd in the ￿eld, called the "satellite
camp", moving the herd between remote waterpoints; hence the model includes a simpli￿ed version
of the waterpoint movement choice. A relatively small portion of the lactating subherd is left at the
base camp, which can provide sustenance to the family members staying behind.
The model captures a potential non-convexity in the returns envelope of the household, which is
driven by the discrete choice between a stochastic, higher expected return herd growth technology,
and a lower-return, but (for simplicity) deterministic herd growth technology. While non-convexities
in returns are often speci￿ed as a ￿xed cost or some other generic speci￿cation, here I focus on three
micro-mechanisms that might drive the threshold: (1) labor earnings available from sedentarism
(which are not available to a household committed to mobile pastoralism, so that such labor earnings
5are a (￿xed) opportunity cost of mobile pastoralism), (2) a subsistence consumption threshold, and
(3) di⁄erential herd-growth returns from each herd growth technology, due both to non-linear herd
growth through reproduction and di⁄erences in herd viability obtaining from mobile pastoralism
versus sedentarism.
At the beginning of a period the household makes a decision about whether to engage in mobile
pastoralism, denoted by M in what follows, or alternative remunerative activities (e.g., petty trading
or wage labor in the town), denoted by A. The household begins the period with two key assets.
First, the livestock herd, containing Z units of livestock, is normalized by a scalar index for available
household labor, l, in order to be converted into a scalar index denoted by Z=l = z ￿ 0, which
is units of livestock per unit of household labor. Second, an immutable ability level, a, which for
simplicity fully captures relative ability in herding.
At the beginning of each period the household faces a choice over adopting the stochastic herd-
growth technology from engaging in mobile pastoralism, gM (z;a;l)￿w = z0, w 2 W, which maps
herd assets at the beginning of the period, z, into herd assets at the end of the period, z0, subject
to the household￿ s ability and labor supply and a mean-one random shock with strictly positive
support, ￿w, where w represents a waterpoint in the set W of waterpoints that the household can
choose to migrate to. The choice of M represents a commitment on the part of the household to
engage in mobile pastoralism, including dedicating the available household labor to this task, and it
is this commitment which generates the ￿ ow bene￿ts. The alternative is the herd growth technology
gA (z) = z0, a non-stochastic growth function based on sedentarism. I omit ability and household
labor from this function by assuming that management of the sedentary herd has few ability or labor
requirements.
I make the following assumptions. First, g is continuously di⁄erentiable, with @gi=@z > 0,
@gM=@a;@gM=@l > 0, and gM (0;a;l)￿ = 0 for any a, gA (0) = 0￿ the next-period herd is greater given
greater ability and starting herd size, and regardless of ability, households cannot create a herd from
nothing. Second, in practice the pastoralist household faces signi￿cant uncertainty over movement
choice, including over rangeland features like rainfall and forage, and the likelihood of experiencing
raids or con￿ ict. Hence I use the expectation operator E to capture subjective expectations over
the distribution of ￿w. Finally, indexation by mobility choice (M or A) captures the idea that herd
growth varies according to whether or not the household engages in mobile pastoralism. As discussed
in McPeak and Barrett (2001), herd productivity can be depressed under sedentary pastoralism,
as forage resources su⁄er from long-term degradation near the villages, and water access can be
constrained during dry seasons. This is only reinforced by more recent work suggesting negative net
herd accumulation below a critical asset threshold (e.g., Lybbert et al., 2004; Barrett et al., 2006).
Hence it is reasonable to assume that if z > 0, EgM (z;a;l)￿ = gM (z;a;l) > z > gA (z), for all l > 0
6and a. Namely, positive herd growth is expected for technology gM, negative herd growth obtains
for gA, and hence at any positive herd size, herd growth is expected to be greater from technology
gM. This generates a bifurcation of herd dynamics around the critical switching threshold between
M and A.
Mobile pastoralism carries with it an opportunity cost, as it involves a commitment of household
labor resources. I model the earnings that can be obtained from choosing a sedentary livelihood
by e(l) 2 [0; ￿ e], which for simplicity I take to be a deterministic function of the index of household
labor supply. The upper bound on returns, ￿ e, captures that idea that earnings opportunities are
limited in a poor, rural setting. For notational simplicity, I take e to be realized in livestock units
. The household can then potentially generate consumption from two sources: bene￿ts taken from
the herd, and alternative sedentary earnings. I use ri (￿), i = A, M, to denote a return function
that translates the ￿ ow bene￿ts from the herd asset (e.g., harvesting milk or blood) into the same
herd-unit return scale as e(l),5 and assume ri ￿ 0, ri (0) = 0 and r0
i (z) > 0. In order to avoid
modeling herd management choices of the household, since they are not considered in the empirical
analysis, I assume that all of the bene￿ts from the herd are ￿ ow bene￿ts. Hence the bene￿ts from
herding are as follows. Mobile pastoralism generates the expected ￿ ow payo⁄ E [r(gM (z;a;l)￿)],
with the expected net gain in herd size (EgM (z;a;l)￿ ￿ z), while the sedentary alternative generates
net ￿ ow payo⁄ [r(gA (z))] + e(l), with net gain in herd size (gA (z) ￿ z).
I assume that the household evaluates returns in herd units according to a utility function U.
I assume that the household faces a minimal subsistence consumption constraint, c(l) > 0, and
that U "kinks" at c: U is strictly increasing, di⁄erentiable, and strictly concave above c, while
below c its slope is constant (for simplicity), and sharply steeper.6 This re￿ ects the idea of a very
strong disutility from obtaining a consumption level below c. Rather than introducing additional
complication through a "soft" subsistence constraint, I instead simply assume that e(l) ￿ c ￿the
household can satisfy its bare minimum consumption needs by remaining sedentary (this may include
taking advantage of food aid, or depending on support from other family members, for example,
in addition to village-based employment opportunities). In order to capture potential dynamic
considerations in choice, I also include the term ￿(z;a;l), strictly increasing in both arguments, which
is meant to capture potential future returns from herd assets, ability, and labor supply, and hence
generates an end-of-period tradeo⁄ in the allocation of herd assets to consumption. In particular, it
5This is for simplicity, under the assumption that ￿ ow bene￿ts from the herd can be realized at their marginal
bene￿t to the household, and all consumption goods are freely available, without additional market transaction costs.
In fact, households are the suppliers of much of their own consumption through milking, etc., in this setting, but
incorporating this subtlety only complicates the modeling.
6Formally, let U be continuous at c: limx"c U (x) = limx#c U (x); however, limx"c U0 (x) < ￿, where ￿ = U0 (x) for
any x 2 [0;c].
7captures the idea that a pastoralist household might choose to sacri￿ce consumption today in order
to preserve the long-run asset stock, which has been called "asset smoothing" (Carter and Barrett
2006; Barrett et al. (2006) provide some evidence for such behavior amongst northern Kenyan
pastoralists.).
The pastoralist household￿ s beginning of period value function is given as follows,
V (z;a;l) = maxfmaxw2W E [U (rM (gM (z;a;l)￿w)) + ￿(gM (z;a;l)￿w;a;l)];
[U (rA (gA (z)) + e(l)) + ￿(gA (z);a;l)]g
s.t. rM (gM (z;a;l)￿w) ￿ c(l),
where the condition rM (gM (z;a;l)￿w) ￿ c(l) only needs to hold if M is chosen.
2.1 Hypotheses: Theoretical Predictions
The basic model above guides us to some implications for herd mobility. The ￿rst Claim concerns
the selection conditions between mobile pastoralism and sedentarism, as a function of herd size per
capita and ability.
Claim 1 There is a threshold function f (z;a), which characterizes the boundary of indi⁄erence
between livelihoods M and A for a given value of l, where for lower values of z;a the household is
more likely to engage in A; hence f identi￿es the Micawber threshold. In addition, for ￿xed values of
a and l > 0, there are threshold values of z, ￿ z and z, where for z > ￿ z the household always engages
in M, and for z < z the household always engages in A.
To derive the second claim just regarding e, notice that for z = 0 returns to herding are de-
terministically set to zero. With l > 0, sedentarism always generates some strictly positive return.
Meanwhile, as long as l > 0, with e bounded by ￿ e, since the herd growth function is strictly increasing
in z and ￿ has strictly positive support, as z ! 1 the expected returns to herding are unbounded.
Since the expected returns to z are monotonic in z, it follows directly that in the range z 2 [0;z] the
household always engages in sedentarism, there is a range (z; ￿ z) in which the household￿ s choice will
depend on its particular risk preferences and other characteristics, while for z 2 [￿ z;1) the household
will always engage in mobile pastoralism.
Claim 2 Because   dictates a consideration of future outcomes, one might pursue mobile pastoralism
in the present period even if it means lower expected payo⁄ in the present.
The result is trivial given that   is increasing in z. What it tells us is that, due to risk, the
induced mobility threshold may be lower than the maximization of static returns would dictate.
8That is, households near (but below) the switching threshold may be induced to engage in mobile
pastoralism, in order to enjoy the increased herd growth (and a potential positive herd growth shock)
in order to leap above the threshold, rather than resigning itself to sedentarism. This implies that we
should be cautious in interpreting the herd-size threshold in the empirical work￿ it probably represents
an absolute lower bound on the static-optimal herd size needed for mobile pastoralism, and hence
policies designed to support mobile pastoralism (such as herd-restocking) should probably work with
a larger threshold.
Claim 3 The e⁄ects of household labor, l, on outcomes are ambiguous. In particular, the expected
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and lower herd growth as per capita herd resources decrease. On the other hand, an increase in
labor implies greater herd growth as l appears positively in the herd growth function for mobile
















gM;z (z;a;l) + gM;l (z;a;l).
This leaves the e⁄ect of labor on mobility ambiguous in general. However, all things equal, given
that the term z=l appears in the expression, this suggests that at higher levels of total labor the
household should be more likely to be mobile.
Greater household labor also generates greater returns from sedentarism, as more household
members are available to seek sedentary earnings. At a very low herd size, where households might
also be expected to be more sensitive to risk, we can expect that the opportunity cost of herding is
too high, particularly for a larger household, and hence sedentarism becomes increasingly likely. As
herd size increases, we expect the propensity to engage in mobile pastoralism to increase. A trivial
extension to the model would be to capture the e⁄ect that as herd size becomes large the household
might be more likely to diversify its returns portfolio, engaging in some town-based business activity
in addition to herding.
The following Claims concerns the household￿ s response to uncertainty.
Claim 4 All things equal, if the household puts greater subjective probability weight on adverse out-
9comes from mobile pastoralism, it is less likely to engage in mobile pastoralism.
This result is unsurprising; formally, as the expectation operator E assigns greater weight to
adverse events (low-￿ shocks), then the household￿ s expected returns to mobile pastoralism are lower,
and hence the household is less likely to engage in mobile pastoralism.
Claim 5 All things equal conditional on mobility, regarding movement choice over the menu of
waterpoints, the household will select waterpoints that best meet the household￿ s desire to minimize
risk.
The model captures the movement choice over w 2 W. Each household has beliefs over the returns
distribution at each waterpoint, which is capturing real-world factors such as con￿ ict or raid potential,
and riskiness of water and forage access. Of course, the returns to waterpoints also depend on the
presence or absence of other herders in that location; I abstract away from this particular factor,
just considering incentives emanating from household and waterpoint characteristics. I conjecture
that greater concerns over waterpoint return factors should direct the household to be more likely to
identify a given waterpoint to locate at, and hence a lower number of movements, a larger maximum
distance moved, a increased time spent at a given waterpoint. Although this is not captured in the
model, I also conjecture that a household with a larger herd, all things equal, should spent greater
time at a given waterpoint, due the increased risk of moving a large herd, and the social power that
larger herds bring.
The last claim will not be tested in the empirics herein; however, the result is useful to verify
relative to existing literature.
Claim 6 The subsistence consumption constraint, along with the assumptions that EgM (z;a;l;￿) >
gA (z) for all z > 0, l > 0 and a, gM (0;a;l;￿) = 0 for any a, gA (0) = 0, and e(l) ￿ c > 0 capture
the idea that the presence of risk might induce underinvestment in productive assets (Rosenzweig and
Binswanger, 1993; Carter and Barrett, 2006). The risk-averse poor may prefer to select the low-risk
asset portfolio, which guarantees the return to meet subsistence consumption, c, in the short run, but
which carries lower expected returns in the long-run.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Operationalizing Mobility
Here I outline the empirical strategy to identify latent mobility, to identify the bifurcation in the
choice of livelihood technology between mobile pastoralism and the sedentary subsistence livelihood.
I begin by de￿ning mobility in this context.
10De￿nition. A given herder household is mobile if it is viable to move a portion of their herd to
a waterpoint outside of the one-day movement radius of the central town they are associated with in
a given time period.
This de￿nition implies that a household is mobile if it has the necessary resources in order to
engage in full-time pastoralism during time periods in which this is necessary (dry or drought periods),
being able to commit household labor to moving livestock which precludes that labor from engaging
in other remunerative activities. The one-day movement radius of the village de￿nes the boundary
between the water resources which are just su¢ cient for those remaining in the village during a given
season, and those outside. In order for mobility to be viable, it has to overcome the opportunity
costs of herding (which partly includes the calculation of the expected returns from maintaining a
given herd stock), and that they meet a minimum subsistence consumption threshold.
The empirical study of mobility involves a latent variable problem (i.e., whether or not a household
is capable of moving its herd, which may or may not be expressed in an observable choice to move).
In order to facilitate inference regarding such a partially-unobservable condition, I introduce an
appropriate assumption based on the context, which is reasonable based on institutional knowledge
about pastoralist behavior.7
Assumption. In a given sample period, a herder is mobile if he moves his herd away from the
base camp to a waterpoint outside the village￿ s one-day movement radius at least once.
This is an appropriate proxy for latent mobility because in practice the weather and water supply
patterns dictate that households will have to move herds of any signi￿cance outside the town￿ s one-
day movement radius, with virtually no exception. While technically this condition should be applied
only to dry seasons, in practice because the survey periods imperfectly overlap wet and dry seasons,
I apply the condition to all seasons in order to save on degrees of freedom. I show in robustness
checks that the distinction is not qualitatively important anyway.
In the empirical implementation this assumption is implemented by carefully categorizing all
waterpoints relative to a given location by whether they are local or remote, where the movement
radius will be derived as part of the empirical work. I do not distinguish between base camp move-
ments and satellite camp movements￿ any signi￿cant movement in response to the state of the world
is considered to be an indication of mobility, whether or not the household￿ s belongings are moved
along with the herd.
7This assumption was veri￿ed informally through discussions with pastoralists in each of the survey towns in
August, 2008.
113.2 Empirical Model
I use a binary choice model to capture the decision over engaging in mobile pastoralism. In order
to ￿ exibly allow for the possibility that there is a threshold e⁄ect on one￿ s propensity to engage in
mobile pastoralism, depending on herd size, I allow herd size to enter the probit speci￿cation through
a ￿ exible functional form. Hence this leads to the following empirical model, where y is the latent
variable representing mobility, taking the value 1 if one is mobile and 0 otherwise, and y￿ represents
the true threshold condition on mobility. y￿ is assumed to be a function f￿ (z;x) of herd size, z,
and other observable covariates, x. As in the theoretical model, in an extension of the model I will
also consider the role of underlying herder "ability" (measured through an appropriate proxy). The
empirical model outlined here is identical in that analysis, where the key parameter of interest, z,
can be taken to be the 2-tuple z = (zh;za), where zh represents herd size and za herder ability. "
represents the distribution of unobservable in￿ uences on choice and noise:
y =
(




1 f￿ (z;x) ￿ "
0 o:w:
; (1)
I want to estimate f￿, given a distribution of ". I make the following functional-form assumption
on f￿:
f
￿ (z;x) = h
￿ (z) + ￿
￿0x, (2)
where h represents a (possibly highly nonlinear) function of herd size,8 z, and ￿
0x represents the
contribution of other covariates in the usual (linear) parametric way. Estimating h￿ is the main focus
of the mobility analysis, though understanding the role of the other linear covariates contributes to
secondary hypotheses.
We can also interpret this model in terms of the probability of choosing y = 1 (mobility),
P [y = 1jx;z] = P [h
￿ (z) + ￿




￿ (z) + ￿
￿0x]:
For identi￿cation purposes, assume F ￿
" is standard normal,9 which gives location and scale, h￿ is
real-valued continuous but unknown, and X has full support. Matzkin (1992, 1994) provides general
identi￿cation results on this class of models.
8When underlying ability is added to the analysis, h naturally takes on the form h(zh;za).
9I focus on the probit model in the analysis, though it is feasible to consider alternative speci￿cations of the error
distribution.
123.3 Implementation
The estimation procedure, allowing for the ￿ exible estimation of h(z), is carried out using a semipara-
metric approach through the use of penalized splines (see, e.g., Ruppert et al., 2003). The essence
of the penalized spline approach is that in addition to the usual regression optimization problem
￿tting a function of covariates to a response variable, it also constructs a penalty matrix, with a
parameterization determining the weight of the penalty. Penalization accounts for the fact that such
￿ exible estimation is susceptible to the over￿tting trap, and hence "wigglyness" of h is penalized.








where minjjy￿f(z;x)jj2 represents the usual optimization problem involved in solving for regression
estimates (quadratic loss function), and ￿P(z;x;y;f;D) represents the penalty component￿ ￿ is a
penalty parameter, and P a matrix product in the data with D, the penalty matrix. Changing the
value of ￿ (i.e., above 1) increases the relative weight on the penalty portion.
The estimation is carried out in the R statistical software program, using the ￿ mgcv￿(generalized
additive model) package developed by Simon N. Wood (2005, 2006, 2009). A short description of
the package is provided in Appendix A.
3.4 Selection on Mobility
In addition to studying the (potential) threshold in herd size and ability for the household￿ s choice to
engage in mobile pastoralism, I additionally study herd movement, conditional on (latent) mobility.
The study of movement is naturally limited to the set of households classi￿ed as mobile under the
condition de￿ned above. Hence the mobility condition acts as a selection equation for the movement
data sample.
4 The Data
4.1 Background on the PARIMA Dataset and Dataset Re￿nements
The data was collected by the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program
(GL CRSP) ￿Improving Pastoral Risk Management on East African Rangelands￿(PARIMA) project.
Survey data on a broad array of household demographic characteristics, herd management choices,
and other consumption, labor, health and educational decisions was collected on a quarterly basis
13from March 2000 to June 2002 from a random selection of households, about 30 per location, at
eleven locations in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia. The locations were intentionally chosen
in order to exhibit variation in terms of ethnic groups represented, rainfall patterns, market access,
and agricultural potential (Barrett et al., 2008). For this study I focus on ￿ve of the Kenya loca-
tions: North Horr (NH), Kargi (KA), Dirib Gumbo (DG), Logologo (LL) and Suguta Marmar (SM),
which exhibit appropriate variation in movement patterns, primarily due to government rangeland
management policies. Controlling for minor sample attrition, I obtain a potential dataset with more
than 150 Kenyan households, with 1720 household-year observations.
Further removal of observations is needed in order to have an appropriate dataset for the questions
posed herein. Hence in each period I keep the sample of households with some herding animals.
Observations also were dropped in cases of missing relevant data; in most cases this was because
household demographic data was not available. After these exclusions I obtain an unbalanced panel
dataset with 1023 household-year observations. For most of the analysis the top 5% of the herd-
size distribution will be dropped as outliers. There is a very small group of wealth herders in the
region, with behavior that is quite unique relative to the rest of the sample. Although removing
these observations does not change the qualitative results of the analysis, it signi￿cantly improves
statistical precision.
The following is an elevation map of the survey region. We see Lake Turkana in the upper left.
The ￿ve main locations are highlighted with a star, and the observed waterpoints (approximately
260) accessed by people from the locations are denoted by a common shape and color. What we see
is that although the waterpoints are largely separated into location-speci￿c zones, there is important
overlap of these zones, particularly in the middle of the map around Mount Marsabit, where Dirib
Gumbo and Logologo are located. We also see signi￿cant migration by the herders from North
Horr, venturing quite far south, and from Kargi, venturing quite far to the east. This highlights the
potential for inter-tribal con￿ ict through the search for water and forage resources.
14Figure. Map of survey region.
A summary description of the main explanatory variables are provided in Appendix A, along
with summary statistics.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section I present the empirical analysis. There are two main sections. First, I outline the
results regarding the determinants of herder mobility and inferences around a mobility threshold.
A number of veri￿cations of the main result are presented, robustness checks are discussed, and I
present addition evidence on the mobility boundary jointly determined by herd size per capita and
ability, with ability measured using stochastic frontier e¢ ciency estimation based on herd growth
performance. Secondly, I present results on an addition test for the mobility threshold. I exploit
exogenous shocks to herd size (animal deaths and thefts) that push a household below the herd-size
threshold, and then study the di⁄erences in subsequent herd growth rates between the "control" group
15which starts above the threshold and doesn￿ t experience such a severe shock, and the "treatment"
group which is knocked below the mobility threshold. Finally, I present results on herder movement
choice, conditional on satisfying the mobility condition. The main results are presented in the body
of the paper, with additional graphical evidence relegated to Appendix B, and additional regression
evidence to Appendix C. The sections are self-contained, with the construction of dependent variables,
regression speci￿cations and results outlined within the same subsection.
6 Mobility
Here I brie￿ y note the regression setups and key terms used to distinguish between them. I will note
how data subsamples are constructed in each case. I de￿ne four kinds of regression setup: basic,
exogenous I and II, and endogeous. Basic regression refers to a setup in which the dependent vari-
able is only run on the key explanatory variable (some version of herd size in TLU) and a constant.
Exogenous I e⁄ects augments Basic by adding time and location dummies. Exogenous II augments
Exogenous I by including individual and household-level characteristics that are realistically exoge-
nous to the decision problem at hand: a measure of family size, the number of adult males in the
household (possible lead herders), and the age of the household head and the household head￿ s years
of education and their squares. The last speci￿cation, endogenous, includes variables that could be
weakly or strongly argued to be endogenous to the movement choice problem: whether the household
harvested crops, whether the household had a bank account, dummy variables for 11 future concerns
that households could state about the future, the proportion of largestock in the total herd￿ s TLU
(where are largestock refers to camels and cattle), and a dummy variable for whether the household
had children away at school.
In fact, for each of the ￿ve dependent variables that will be described in what follows, I run ￿ve
speci￿cations. I ￿rst run the Basic speci￿cation on the entire sample. Then I truncate the sample
by dropping observations for the period June 2000, as I will need to take lags of certain variables,
primarily the Concerns variable (so that reported Concerns are regressed on the period they applied
to). Then I essentially run the four speci￿cations above on the slightly smaller dataset. In most cases
I will not refer to these speci￿cations by name, but rather by number, hence they will be: (1) Basic
speci￿cation on full data, (2) Basic speci￿cation with period June 2000 dropped, (3) Exogenous I
speci￿cation with period June 2000 dropped, (4) Exogenous II speci￿cation with period June 2000
dropped, (5) Endogenous speci￿cation with period June 2000 dropped.
To implement the mobility analysis, I use a penalized spline approach as outlined previously. All
four of the possible speci￿cations described above (basic, exogenous, endogenous I, endogenous II) are
16considered, where each one implies a di⁄erent speci￿cation of x, the vector of secondary regressors.
The construction of the key dependent variable was largely outlined previously in the section on
Empirical Strategy. Namely, it is a 0-1 variable that takes a value of 1 if a household has moved
a portion of its herd to at least one "remote" waterpoint in the sample period, where remote is
de￿ned as a movement of at least 25 km. away from the base camp.10 This is based on the rough
rule of thumb that an animal such as a camel can travel approximately 25 km. in one day, with
the idea being that such a distance only allows for movements by pastoralists who are committed to
herding full-time. Hence immobile herders would not access such remote waterpoints, and this could
seriously threaten the viability of their herd, lowering expected herd growth and ￿ ow bene￿ts from
the herd. This threshold is subjected to a number of checks of robustness in Appendix B, which will
be discussed later. The regression speci￿cation for this part of the analysis was also outlined in the
section on Empirical Strategy.
6.0.1 Results
The ￿rst set of results are from the semiparametric speci￿cation on mobility. The results are presented
in two stages.
10The information on waterpoint names is based on the question "Tell me about all water points you have used to
water your animals since the last interview."
17Figure. In￿ uence of TLU per Head on Mobility.
First, the herd-in￿ uence function, presented as a ￿ exible functional form of herd size. The above
￿gure is generated from the "preferred" speci￿cation, (3). It can be seen that there is a very strong
e⁄ect of herd size on mobility up until approximately a size of 2 TLU per head, and a continued
strong in￿ uence, including through the upper limit of the error band, up to about 5 TLU per head.
Then, the graph shows a number of smaller e⁄ects, which are not easily distinguishable statistically,
with the most noticeable a small dip around 7.5 TLU per head. Finally, the graph rises up again at
about 10 TLU per head. As of about 10 TLU per head the function seems to decline slightly, though
at this point statistical precision begins to disperse due to the lack of observations.
These results can be compared to the results presented in the Introduction, on previous work
looking at the bifurcation in asset accumulation dynamics. We would expect that if the main hy-
pothesis in this paper about mobility as the key factor driving asset dynamics is valid, then the
threshold in the incentive to engage in mobile pastoralism should roughly match the bifurcation in
asset accumulation dynamics. In Lybbert et al. (2004) we see that (with herd size in logs), that the
bifurcation point in herd size dynamics occurs as of about 2.25. Once this number is converted back
to regular form, it seems that the key threshold is at about 10 TLU (i.e., e2:25 = 9:49). Given that
18mean normalized household labor supply is at just under 4, it appears that the strongest mobility
e⁄ect of TLU per head seems to match well with that work. In addition, we see a strong continued
e⁄ect up to about 2.6; with e2:6 = 13:46, the ￿nal threshold e⁄ect seems somewhat lower (once
converted into terms of TLU per head) but this may be due to contextual di⁄erences. Looking at
the results in Barrett et al. (2006), which are already converted into TLU per head, we ￿nd that
again the results match quite consistently. The noticeable mobility e⁄ect occurs up to about 5 TLU
per head, which is the crossing point in that latter paper, and then the upper, stable dynamic asset
accumulation equilibrium is at about 10 TLU per head, after which the e⁄ect of herd size seems
to level o⁄. Hence it appears that there is a strong threshold e⁄ect in mobility, which seems to be
closely connected to the poverty trap thresholds we observe in the asset accumulation analysis in
prior work.
This result is subjected to a number of robustness checks in Appendix B. These include: controls
for other variables than herd size, variations in the de￿nition of mobility (i.e., thresholds di⁄erent
from 25 km.), running the data only on dry season or wet season data, and varying the de￿nition of
outliers. From each of these robustness checks we see support for the main argument: that there is
a threshold e⁄ect in movement to waterpoints beyond about one day￿ s travel, and the strongest part
of the threshold e⁄ect occurs approximately at the bifurcation point in asset accumulation dynamics
that is observed in the prior literature.
However, the graph of the ￿ exible functional form representation of herd-size in￿ uence is only
part of the story. In addition, the semiparametric approach (as opposed to a fully nonparametric
approach) allows for a number of other explanatory variables to be run. These are run linearly, and
the results for the ￿ve regression speci￿cations are given in the following table.
19Variable (1) se (2) se (3) se (4) se (5) se
Dec 2000 -0.06736 0.18304 -0.066925 0.1882419 -0.00145 0.1951646
Mar 2001 -0.43533 ** 0.19015 -0.4342391 ** 0.1955498 -0.3982773 ** 0.2014195
June 2001 -0.31133 * 0.18918 -0.3020035 0.1947619 -0.2996179 0.2084108
Sept 2001 -0.40466 ** 0.18992 -0.3722421 * 0.1950823 -0.3531379 0.2042109
Dec 2001 -0.81837 *** 0.20127 -0.8049586 *** 0.206097 -0.7180031 * 0.2229658
March 2002 -0.36634 * 0.19759 -0.3902377 * 0.2038896 -0.3065791 *** 0.2157513
June 2002 -0.75108 *** 0.20975 -0.7569213 *** 0.2155669 -0.7054593 0.2230797
Kargi 0.7048 *** 0.21749 0.6677241 *** 0.2289817 1.387607 *** 0.4115941
Logologo 1.07643 *** 0.18451 1.1409021 *** 0.1943366 1.2150826 *** 0.3280258
North Horr 1.56871 *** 0.20977 1.4394345 *** 0.2190975 1.5688354 *** 0.3976523
Suguta Marmar 1.16533 *** 0.19362 1.1773573 *** 0.2032108 1.2705219 *** 0.3081645
Family labor -0.0157117 0.0573423 0.0195642 0.06056
# adult male 0.0265983 0.0744298 -0.002544 0.07783
H-hold head male 0.2177808 * 0.1234607 0.1191122 0.1337733
Age h-hold head 0.0415779 0.0280639 0.0357899 0.028518
Age h-hold head^2 -0.0003047 0.0002679 -0.0002451 0.0002744
Head years education -0.123101 * 0.071242 -0.1021992 0.0743115
Head years education^2 0.0125812 * 0.0065505 0.0108695 0.0068205
Crops harvested -0.1603821 0.272179
Bank account -0.1794006 0.2205736
Concern: pasture for animals 0.3458761 * 0.2030619
Concern: water for animals 0.0012083 0.194638
Concern: animal sickness/death -0.2659096 0.2272844
Concern: animal theft/raiding 0.2968772 0.23983
Concern: Insecurity/violence/fights 0.276888 0.2476293
Concern: Human sickness 0.0343206 0.2459856
Concern: No buyers for animals -0.4709438 * 0.2619477
Concern: Low prices for animals -0.296478 0.2506551
Concern: Not enough food -0.1134606 0.1950024
Concern: High prices 0.1915252 0.2542297
Concern: Crop failure 0.1581234 0.1873362
Proportion largestock -0.0652549 0.332078
Kids away at school -0.2259276 * 0.1306601
Constant -0.33 *** 0.04425 -0.36552 *** 0.04736 -0.96372 *** 0.18879 -2.3079086 *** 0.703333 -2.258914 *** 0.8174718
h(TLU per head)
  edf. 8.46 8.295 8.631 8.476 8.519
  Ref. df. 8.46 8.295 8.631 8.476 8.52
  Chi. Sq. 93.82 75.81 39.19 36.33 27.89
  Log-likelihood -563.44 -493.8711 -438.3148 -417.3381 -405.2403
  p-value 0.00 *** 4.83E-13 *** 7.84E-06 *** 2.27E-05 *** 0.000718 ***
  R-squared (adj.) 0.10 0.0877 0.207 0.217 0.232
  UBRE score 0.24 0.2378 0.12902 0.12897 0.13645
  n 931 813 813 788 788
*** Sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5%, * sig. at 10%.
Table. Main mobility regressions.
In the statement of results from semiparametric regressions, UBRE stands for "Un-Biased Risk
Estimator", which is basically the gam equivalent of the AIC criterion. The computer package
selects the best spline speci￿cation through the use of the UBRE. The package provides information
on assessing the "signi￿cance" of the spline function.
6.0.2 Further Assessment of Mobility Result
In this section I present further assessment of the mobility result, including testing and representation,
and further study which incorporates the consideration of herder ability. Throughout the results from
speci￿cation (1) of the semiparametric model are employed.
Response Function The Figure above, which represents the h￿ function presenting the in￿ uence
of herd size per capita on mobility, can only be interpreted qualitatively; i.e., the response values
on the y-axis only have meaning in the context of the probit. The following graph provides a more
20useful iteration of that result￿ it calculates the predicted response values based on the estimated
function, taking the other values at their means. This provides perhaps a more useful representation
of expected response, where now the values on the y-axis can be interpreted as the propensity to
engage in mobile pastoralism. Again we see a con￿rmation of the above results.11
Figure. Response plot.
Derivative Test A key question about the estimated ￿ exible function is over what ranges it is
(strictly) increasing or decreasing. The following graph provides an initial approach to this question.
We see that the derivative of the herd in￿ uence function is strictly positive (even according to its error
bands) below about 2 TLU per head, while it is testably below non-positive (including error bands)
as of just above 5 TLU per head. It can also be seen that apart from a short segment at around 8
TLU per head, elsewhere the slope of the function is not testably di⁄erent from zero. However, this
seems supportive of my initial result on a threshold e⁄ect in the mobile pastoralism livelihood.
11The estimation beyond 15 TLU per head is largely out of sample, hence it should be interpreted with more caution.
21Figure. Graph of derivative with errors.
Comparison to Parametric Model A key question about semiparametric methods is: what do
they buy us beyond a (simpler) parametric model? Why not just run a very ￿ exible functional form
in the key response variable(s)? This subsection presents a preliminary approach to this question,
by employing a Chi-square test for a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the semiparametric
spline in a generalized additive model framework, and a standard parametric functional form, with a
4th-order polynomial in herd size. With a p-value of 0.02296, the test indicates that the two models
are statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent, within the 5% rule of thumb.
6.1 Herd Mobility and Ability
I carry a ￿nal application in this section. Following the procedure of Santos and Barrett (2006) I use
stochastic production frontier e¢ ciency estimates to derive a measure of unobserved herder ability.
Taking herd growth as the dependent variable (output), ine¢ ciency is then measured as the degree
to which a household is below the (population) herd growth frontier. An inversion of the ine¢ ciency
22estimate provides a measure of e¢ ciency. I then use the e¢ ciency estimates as explanatory variables
in a higher-dimensional analysis of potential thresholds in mobility choice: I take households to hold
two assets, TLU per head and ability, and look at an estimated joint smooth function.
The ￿rst step is to carry the stochastic production frontier estimates, in which I follow Santos
and Barrett (2006) as much as possible. The following is the output from that estimation. The
￿rst 8 terms of 2 sets of 4 variables capture the e⁄ect a 4th-order quadratic function of herd size in
TLU interacted with whether or not a household is above or below a threshold of TLU per head of
5. The 9th and 10th covariates are analagous representations interacted with family size (i.e., labor
availability).
    sigma_v2    1.975602   .1018551                      1.775969    2.175234
    sigma_u2    .3581099   19.51115                     -37.88303    38.59925
       gamma    .1534508   7.077597                      7.62e-48           1
      sigma2    2.333712   19.51194                      1.78e-07    3.05e+07
  /ilgtgamma   -1.707788   54.48343    -0.03   0.975    -108.4934    105.0778
   /lnsigma2      .84746   8.360904     0.10   0.919    -15.53961    17.23453
         /mu   -13.25445   735.6328    -0.02   0.986    -1455.068    1428.559
       _cons    1.010738   .6937634     1.46   0.145    -.3490134    2.370489
      loc_NH   -.5433199    .213432    -2.55   0.011    -.9616389   -.1250009
      loc_LL   -.2246186   .1819955    -1.23   0.217    -.5813232     .132086
      loc_KG   -.1276476   .2188012    -0.58   0.560    -.5564901    .3011948
      loc_DG   -.5831049   .1801676    -3.24   0.001    -.9362269    -.229983
         dry   -.0992959   .1024527    -0.97   0.332    -.3000996    .1015078
  adult_male    .0347878   .0758629     0.46   0.647    -.1139007    .1834763
 head_gender    .1192147   .1233994     0.97   0.334    -.1226437    .3610731
  age_head_2   -.0006067   .0002688    -2.26   0.024    -.0011335   -.0000798
    age_head    .0610892    .027939     2.19   0.029     .0063297    .1158487
  head_edu_2    .0074316   .0067106     1.11   0.268    -.0057208    .0205841
    head_edu   -.0550172   .0690792    -0.80   0.426      -.19041    .0803756
  no_tlu_lag   (omitted)
fam_size_b~r   -.1524821   .0608099    -2.51   0.012    -.2716674   -.0332969
fam_size_a~r    .0999652   .0875929     1.14   0.254    -.0717138    .2716442
tlu_~l_thr_4    .0025408   .0005509     4.61   0.000     .0014611    .0036206
tlu_~l_thr_3   -.0701102   .0138608    -5.06   0.000    -.0972769   -.0429436
tlu_~l_thr_2    .6000454   .1057291     5.68   0.000     .3928203    .8072706
tlu_ph~l_thr   -1.877882   .2783078    -6.75   0.000    -2.423356   -1.332409
tlu_~b_thr_4    .0000339   .0000214     1.58   0.114    -8.15e-06    .0000759
tlu_~b_thr_3   -.0025805   .0012685    -2.03   0.042    -.0050668   -.0000943
tlu_~b_thr_2    .0675137   .0235933     2.86   0.004     .0212716    .1137557
tlu_ph~b_thr   -.7104028   .1581082    -4.49   0.000    -1.020289   -.4005165
   herd_grow       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
Log likelihood  = -1333.7421 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(21)      =    101.75
                                                               max =         8
                                                               avg =       6.0
                                                Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: master Number of groups   =       127
Time-invariant inefficiency model               Number of obs      =       758
What follows is a 3-dimensional plot of the joint e⁄ect of TLU per head and ability on the threshold
in mobility choice. It can be seen here that one￿ s propensity to engage in mobile pastoralism is quite
high if one is of very high e¢ ciency or high TLU herd size (or both). When both e¢ ciency and herd
size are lower, we see that the relationship is much more tenous: herders are not as likely to engage
in mobile pastoralism.
23The result can be seen more starkly in the following diagram, which is of the same object, only
from an overhead "contour" pro￿le. Here we see the suggestion of an "isoquant" frontier which
exhibits the roughly convex tradeo⁄ in e¢ ciency (ability) and herd size, in terms of a household￿ s
propensity to engage in mobile pastoralism.
246.2 Additional Inferences Around the Threshold
As an additional test of the mobility threshold hypothesis, I look at a "natural experiment" in
the data. The theory assumes that herd growth rates should di⁄er above and below the mobility
threshold, as herd households make use of two di⁄erent herd growth technologies. In particular,
when animals do not migrate during dry seasons they may receive lower nutrient inputs due to a
lack of resources in the villages, and hence have lower growth rates. We would also expect that herd
growth would su⁄er at small herd sizes simply due to the biology of reproduction.
Hence I look at the following test. I consider herd-growth rates from two classes of households.
The "treatment" sample is the subset of households that begin above the mobility threshold, and
through plausibly exogenous shocks to herd stock (animal death, and loss due to theft) are shocked
below the mobility threshold. The "control" sample is constituted by households that begin above
the threshold and remain there. I then compare the subsequent herd-growth rates of the two groups.
Under a number of speci￿cations (for mobility threshold, and appropriate truncation of the sample
at 8, 10 and 12 TLU per head, in order to have a consistent comparison), I ￿nd that the expected
di⁄erence in herd growth rates does indeed hold consistently, although the di⁄erence is never at a
25statistically signi￿cant level. This may simply be due to sample size issues. Hence I do not report
these results in the paper, though they are available upon request.
6.3 Movement
I provide evidence on the herd movements of households that are classi￿ed as mobile. As discussed
previously, I use mobility as a selection condition to identify the set of observations for this part of the
study. I use three main measures to quantify movement choices, running them as dependent variables
in appropriate empirical speci￿cations for their sampling properties, which will be described shortly.
The three measures are a normalized measure of number of movements per quarter, two measures
of time spent at given waterpoints, and each mobile household￿ s maximum distance traveled in each
quarter. Histograms summarizing the empirical distributions of each of the dependent variables are
provided at the end of Appendix A. Throughout I index individual herder households by i and time
periods (quarters) by t.
First, an index of the number of waterpoints visited in a period. It is calculated as the number
of waterpoints visited by a household in a quarter, divided by the number of animal types of a
herder within the categories of camels, cattle and smallstock. Hence the variable is not biased by the
fact that herders with more animal types are naturally more likely to visit more waterpoints due to
di⁄erent animal dietary preferences. The regression setup is as follows,
Num_movementsit = max
￿
0;￿0 + hit￿11 + h
2
it￿12 + Xt￿2 + "it
￿
(5)
where Num_movementsit is the dependent variable for (normalized) number of herd movements per
household in period t, hit is the herd size of household i in period t in TLU per capita, Xit represents
a set of additional regressors, and "itjhit;h2
it;Xt ￿ N (0;￿2).
Second, the measure of time spent at waterpoints involves an adaptation of the Her￿ndahl index.
In this context it is used as a measure of the "agglomeration in remote waterpoint visits"￿ if large
portions of the herd spend many weeks at a few or one remote waterpoint, then the index will take










x (t) represents the time allocation to a waterpoint x in a given sample period (quarter) by
subherd l, ￿l
x represents the duration of time subherd l spends at location x in period t, and 13 is a
normalization by total available weeks for a subherd in a given period. The Her￿ndahl-Time index










which is meant to take values between zero and one.
The second version of the Her￿ndahl index is meant to capture the idea that we might want to
consider the size of the herd being sent to each remote waterpoint for given time periods, to provide












x (t) represents the herd-time allocation to a waterpoint x in a given sample period (quarter)
by subherd l, where hl
x (t) is the size of the herd l allocated to location x in period t, ￿l
x represents
the duration of time subherd l spends at location x in period t, and 13 ￿ h(t) is a normalization
by total available herd-weeks. The Her￿ndahl-Herd-Time index is then constructed as follows in a










which is meant to take values between zero and one.
Since the Her￿ndahl index variable is also a censored dependent variable (between 0 and 1) I
again use a Tobit speci￿cation. It is similar to the case for number of movements,
Herfit = max
￿




it￿13 + Xt￿2 + "it
￿
where Herfit is the dependent variable for the Her￿ndahl index as described above (which can rep-
resent HTit or HHTit), hit is the herd size of household i in period t in TLU per capita (allowing
for squared and cubed terms permitting additional functional ￿ exibility), Xit represents a set of
additional regressors, and "itjhit;h2
it;Xt ￿ N (0;￿2).
The third dependent variable constructed in the analysis of movement is a representation of the
distance traveled by a household￿ s herds in a given period. Given that we observe movements for a
number of subherds of a given household, there are a number of measures that one could construct
to get distance traveled in response to certain observables. In this case I focus on the maximum
distance traveled, which is measured as the shortest distance in kilometers from the household￿ s
central location to a given waterpoint.
Since a number of the "movements" in this sample involve zero distance moved (even though at
27least one movement will be signi￿cant), it will again be necessary to use a Tobit regression to account








it￿13 + Xt￿2 + "it
￿
,
where Distanceit represents the maximum distance moved, and the right-hand-side variables are the
same as in previous speci￿cations.
6.3.1 Results
In this section I present the regression results on movement. The regressions presented here are not
presented so much as a test of the implications of the guiding model in this paper, but rather as a
way to generate stylized facts on the movement choices involved in mobile pastoralism, based on the
mobility selection criterion implied by the preceding analysis. Here a selection criterion is applied
so that only "mobile" observations are retained. I again remove the top 5% observations on the
TLU distribution as outliners. The key results on movement, for (1) Number of movements in a
sample quarter, (2) Time spent at waterpoints, and (3) Maximum distance traveled, are presented
in Appendix C, and summarized brie￿ y here.
The main result for Number of Movements is that larger herd size tends to predict less movement,
perhaps suggesting that better herders are able to maintain larger herds by better selecting locations
to move to, or that larger herds are able to better compete for scarce water and forage resources.
Second, based on the constructed Her￿ndahl index, results seem to indicate that price and market
e⁄ects are most important in determining the herd size-weighted time allocation variable: cropping
activities, and concerns about market prices for both purchases and livestock sales are the signi￿cant
variables in this regression. Third, I run the maximum distance travelled by a household in a given
period as a dependent variable, as a measure of distance travelled. The results are surprising in that
very few variables are statistically signi￿cant; about all that is signi￿cant are the location dummies
on the driest locations (where we might expect the longest movements, as the herders will have to
travel long distances in the search for viable water and forage resources).
7 Conclusion
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of mobility and movement in a pas-
toralist population in northern Kenya, which has implications for other arid and semi-arid regions in
east Africa and beyond.
28Most importantly, the analysis provides support for the hypothesis that mobility is the key de-
terminant of the bifurcation point in herd accumulation dynamics observed in other research on this
population. The quantitative estimate of where the herd-size threshold might occur is useful for
policymakers concerned with herd-restocking or attempts to promote sustainable pastoralism in the
region as a means to combat poverty. Secondly, the paper provides further evidence on the determi-
nants of movement in the population, which may be of further interest to policymakers concerned
with environmental degradation and ethnic con￿ ict in the region.
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics, Graphical Data Summaries,
and Description of Variables
7.1 Discussion of mgcv Package
mgcv is a package designed to ￿t generalized additive models (GAMs). The ￿ generalization￿referred
to is the allowance for the estimation of smooth functions of covariates. GAMs build on the framework
of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs), which are a class of models that uses a link function to connect
the covariates to the response variable, and includes probit and logit models, among others. The
model ￿t is given by penalized cubic spline regressions, wher e the knot points, spline bases and
penalty parameters (￿) are chosen according to the Un-Biased Risk Estimator, which is essentially
the natural extension of the AIC criterion to this class of models.12 As noted above, in order to
12mgcv allows for alternative criteria for the selection of the smoothness parameter, including Generalized Cross
Validation (GCV) and Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML).
31achieve identi￿cation in this class of models a scaling assumption is needed, which is implemented
through setting the parameter scale=1.
Summary Statistics
I provide summary statistics based on the data sample used most commonly in the analysis, after
dropping missing observations and outliers above the 95th percentile of the remaining distribution
of TLU per unit of household labor, leaving an unbalanced panel dataset with 931 observations.13
The ￿rst table provides summary statistics on the distribution of herd size in TLU. The second table
provides summary statistics on household labor, recalling the formula that a weight of 0 is given to
houshold members between 0 and 8 years of age; a weight of 0.5 is given to children between 9 and
15, and adults 55 and above; and full unit weight is given to household members between the ages
of 16 and 54.
The correlation between TLU Animals and household labor supply is 0.1394, which seems rather
low. This may suggest that the distribution of herding ability is fairly dispersed. In addition, if herd
size represents a long-run dynamic equilibrium as a function of herder ability on average, then the
relatively low correlation might suggest that household fertility behavior is not terribly responsive





10% 2.1 0.2 Obs 931
25% 4.5 0.2 Sum of Wgt. 931
50% 11.1 Mean 15.141
Largest Std. Dev. 13.320
75% 23.0 62.4
90% 34.5 68.0 Variance 177.432
95% 39.7 71.5 Skewness 1.291
99% 55.9 98.1 Kurtosis 5.164
TLU Animals
Summary Statistics on Herd Size in TLU.




10% 2.0 0.5 Obs 931
25% 2.5 0.5 Sum of Wgt. 931
50% 3.5 Mean 3.744
Largest Std. Dev. 1.645
75% 4.5 9.5
90% 6.0 9.5 Variance 2.705
95% 7.0 9.5 Skewness 0.808
99% 9.5 9.5 Kurtosis 3.945
*Age 0-8 = 0, 9-15 = 0.5, 16-54 = 1, 55+ = 0.5
Family Labor*
Family labor supply in TLU.
Histograms
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Herd size in TLU, per unit of household labor
Figure. Distribution of TLU per unit
household labor, up to 95th percentile.
33Explanatory Variables
Here are some brief notes on the meaning of further independent variables (including the survey
questions used to elicit them). Note that for the concern variables, I used lagged values, since the
herders were asked to make a projection into the future quarter. Hence when I run a regression
on the full dataset with the concern controls, I must drop the observations for the ￿rst time period
(June 2000).
￿ (Month) xxxx dummy. Dummy variable taking value 1 in the speci￿ed time period, where the
Month (March, June, September, December) and year are given (the latter by xxxx, either
2000, 2001, or 2002).
￿ X location dummy. Dummy taking value 1 for an observation in a given location. There are
￿ve locations used in the analysis: Dirib Gumbo (DG), Kargi (KG), Logologo (LL), North Horr
(NH), and Sugata Marmar (SM). DG is always used as the control dummy.
￿ Herd size in TLU. Herd size in tropical livestock units. Herders were asked to report their
household herd size at each quarterly survey round, including counts of male and female camels,
cattle, sheep and goats. The value of the herd size prior to a given round is used in the
regressions (assuming movements depend most on the herd size entering the period). Hence
the herd size is "lagged forward" in some sense.
￿ Normalized family size. A measure of available family labor is given. Adults between the ages
of 16 and 54 are given a value of 1, while children between 8 and 15 and the elderly are given
a value of 0.5, and infants and young children are given a labor value of 0.
￿ # adult male. The number of adult males in the household (assumed as a proxy for herding
labor supply).
￿ H-hold head dummy. Takes a value of 1 if the household head is male.
￿ Age hhold head. The age of the household head, in years.
￿ Head years education. The household head￿ s years of education in years.
￿ Crops harvested dummy. Has your household harvested any crops since the last interview?
(Y/N)
￿ Current have bank account dummy. Do you currently have a bank account? (Y/N)
34￿ Concern: pasture for animals. Are you concerned with: Not enough pasture for animals?
(Y/N)
￿ Concern: water for animals. Are you concerned with: Not enough water for animals? (Y/N)
￿ Concern: animal sickness/death. Are you concerned with: Animal sickness / death? (Y/N)
￿ Concern: animal theft/raiding. Are you concerned with: Animals loss due to theft / raiding?
(Y/N)
￿ Concern: Insecurity/violence/￿ghts. Are you concerned with: Insecurity / violence / ￿ghts?
(Y/N)
￿ Concern: Human sickness. Are you concerned with: Human sickness? (Y/N)
￿ Concern: No buyers for animals. Are you concerned with: No buyers for animals you wish to
sell? (Y/N)
￿ Concern: Low prices for animals. Are you concerned with: Low prices for animals you wish to
sell? (Y/N)
￿ Concern: Not enough food for ppl. Are you concerned with: Not enough food for people?
(Y/N)
￿ Concern: High prices for purchases. Are you concerned with: High prices for things you buy?
(Y/N)
￿ Concern: Crops fail. Are you concerned with: Crops fail? (Y/N)
￿ Proportion of largestock in herd. Proportion of tlu of the herd in cattle or camels (as a fraction
of total tlu).
￿ Kids away at school (dummy). Takes a value of 1 if the household has children away at school.
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36Appendix B: Graphical Presentation of Results
Mobility
In this section I present the graphs of the ￿ exible function of TLU Animals, for a number of data
sample sizes, and regression speci￿cations.
Additional Graphs for Main Mobility Regression
The following graphs depict the in￿ uence function for TLU per Head for the speci￿cations (1),
(2), (4) and (5).
Figure. Spec. (1). Figure. Spec. (2).
Figure. Spec. (4). Figure. Spec. (5).
377.3 Robustness for Main Mobility Regression
Graphs of Herd-Size In￿ uence Function at Various Herd-size Thresholds
Here we consider the herd-size in￿ uence function on the basic speci￿cation (speci￿cation (1)), with
the distance threshold necessary to de￿ne mobility and thresholds varying from 5 to 35. Sample size
is also identical to speci￿cation (1): it eliminates outliers above the 95th percentile of the herd-size
distribution, but includes period June 2000.
Figure. Threshold 5 km. Figure. Threshold 10 km.
Figure. Threshold 15 km. Figure. Threshold 20 km.
38Figure. Threshold 30 km. Figure. Threshold 35 km.
Appendix C: Regression Results
Number of Movements
39(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Herd size in TLU 0.0022 (0.0069) 0.0045 (0.0075) 0.0003 (0.0078) 0.0016 (0.0082) 0.0020 (0.0094)
Herd size in TLU squared -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0000 (0.0002) -0.0000 (0.0002) -0.0000 (0.0002)
December 2000 dummy 0.1762** (0.0823) 0.1790** (0.0846) 0.1952** (0.0860)
March 2001 dummy 0.0240 (0.0945) 0.0069 (0.0967) 0.0343 (0.1000)
June 2001 dummy -0.1454 (0.0888) -0.1549* (0.0906) -0.0962 (0.0974)
September 2001 dummy 0.0444 (0.0889) 0.0365 (0.0901) 0.0264 (0.0918)
December 2001 dummy 0.2775*** (0.1066) 0.2876*** (0.1078) 0.3111*** (0.1143)
March 2002 dummy 0.0060 (0.0969) -0.0036 (0.0996) 0.0317 (0.1011)
June 2002 dummy -0.0122 (0.1083) -0.0125 (0.1096) 0.0051 (0.1107)
Kargi location dummy 0.2113 (0.1443) 0.2046 (0.1594) 0.3616 (0.2257)
Logologo location dummy 0.1555 (0.1354) 0.1450 (0.1466) 0.1991 (0.2063)
North Horr location dummy -0.1537 (0.1422) -0.2104 (0.1493) 0.0776 (0.2263)
Suguta Marmar location dummy -0.1729 (0.1379) -0.1929 (0.1527) -0.0855 (0.1963)
Normalized family size 0.0282 (0.0238) 0.0465* (0.0247)
# adult male -0.0061 (0.0320) -0.0277 (0.0328)
H-hold head dummy (1 if male) 0.0078 (0.0686) 0.0244 (0.0724)
Age hhold head 0.0040 (0.0163) -0.0020 (0.0168)
Age hhold head squared -0.0000 (0.0002) -0.0000 (0.0002)
Head years education -0.0434 (0.0417) -0.0155 (0.0439)
Head years education squared 0.0022 (0.0036) -0.0005 (0.0038)
Crops harvested dummy 0.3420** (0.1720)
Currently have bank account dummy -0.1752* (0.0977)
Concern: pasture for animals -0.0666 (0.1347)
Concern: water for animals -0.0721 (0.1162)
Concern: animal sickness/death 0.0914 (0.1392)
Concern: animal theft/raiding 0.2263 (0.1438)
Concern: Insecurity/violence/fights -0.3156** (0.1406)
Concern: Human sickness -0.1208 (0.1381)
Concern: No buyers for animals 0.0004 (0.1714)
Concern: Low prices for animals 0.2356 (0.1708)
Concern: Not enough food for ppl 0.0950 (0.1220)
Concern: High prices for purchases 0.1788 (0.1699)
Concern: Crops fail 0.2377** (0.1129)
Proportion of largestock in herd -0.0064 (0.1871)
Kids away at school (dummy) 0.0989 (0.0626)
Constant 1.0524*** (0.0667) 1.0147*** (0.0723) 0.9992*** (0.1448) 0.8092* (0.4255) 0.3760 (0.5152)
Observations 353 304 304 298 298
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.190 0.210 0.281
r2_a -0.004233 -0.005133 0.1538 0.1533 0.1850
F 0.2582 0.2263 5.2364 3.6883 2.9260
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: normalized number of movements.
40Time Spent (Her￿ndahl)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Herd size in TLU -0.0052 (0.0037) -0.0063 (0.0040) -0.0011 (0.0042) -0.0010 (0.0043) -0.0016 (0.0049)
Herd size in TLU squared 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
December 2000 dummy -0.1866*** (0.0442) -0.1883*** (0.0448) -0.1631*** (0.0446)
March 2001 dummy -0.2173*** (0.0508) -0.2233*** (0.0512) -0.2174*** (0.0518)
June 2001 dummy -0.2123*** (0.0477) -0.2063*** (0.0479) -0.2151*** (0.0505)
September 2001 dummy -0.0771 (0.0477) -0.0736 (0.0477) -0.0484 (0.0476)
December 2001 dummy -0.0718 (0.0572) -0.0686 (0.0570) -0.0471 (0.0592)
March 2002 dummy -0.1348** (0.0520) -0.1278** (0.0527) -0.1055** (0.0524)
June 2002 dummy -0.2223*** (0.0581) -0.2092*** (0.0580) -0.1720*** (0.0574)
Kargi location dummy -0.0397 (0.0774) -0.0544 (0.0842) -0.0912 (0.1170)
Logologo location dummy 0.0766 (0.0726) 0.0598 (0.0775) 0.0646 (0.1069)
North Horr location dummy -0.0420 (0.0763) -0.0154 (0.0789) -0.0175 (0.1174)
Suguta Marmar location dummy 0.1097 (0.0740) 0.1193 (0.0807) 0.1136 (0.1016)
Normalized family size -0.0024 (0.0126) -0.0121 (0.0128)
# adult male 0.0069 (0.0169) 0.0211 (0.0170)
H-hold head dummy (1 if male) -0.0293 (0.0363) -0.0172 (0.0376)
Age hhold head -0.0066 (0.0086) -0.0026 (0.0087)
Age hhold head squared 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001)
Head years education 0.0407* (0.0220) 0.0426* (0.0227)
Head years education squared -0.0034* (0.0019) -0.0035* (0.0019)
Crops harvested dummy -0.0722 (0.0891)
Currently have bank account dummy 0.0712 (0.0506)
Concern: pasture for animals 0.1668** (0.0698)
Concern: water for animals -0.1932*** (0.0604)
Concern: animal sickness/death -0.0223 (0.0721)
Concern: animal theft/raiding -0.0166 (0.0745)
Concern: Insecurity/violence/fights 0.0014 (0.0728)
Concern: Human sickness 0.0523 (0.0715)
Concern: No buyers for animals 0.0393 (0.0888)
Concern: Low prices for animals -0.1012 (0.0884)
Concern: Not enough food for ppl 0.0467 (0.0632)
Concern: High prices for purchases 0.0823 (0.0880)
Concern: Crops fail 0.0065 (0.0589)
Proportion of largestock in herd -0.1041 (0.0969)
Kids away at school (dummy) 0.0823** (0.0324)
Constant 0.4063*** (0.0358) 0.4245***(0.0387) 0.4799*** (0.0777) 0.6024*** (0.2250) 0.5167* (0.2670)
Observations 353 304 304 298 298
chi2 2.0791 2.6981 52.162 57.826 82.042
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: TLU-unweighted Her￿ndahl.
41(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Herd size in TLU -0.0111** (0.0044) -0.0110** (0.0047) -0.0059 (0.0049) -0.0067 (0.0051) -0.0151*** (0.0057)
Herd size in TLU squared 0.0002** (0.0001) 0.0002* (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
December 2000 dummy -0.1004* (0.0515) -0.0930* (0.0522) -0.0870* (0.0512)
March 2001 dummy -0.0924 (0.0592) -0.0821 (0.0598) -0.0773 (0.0595)
June 2001 dummy -0.0838 (0.0556) -0.0750 (0.0559) -0.0951 (0.0580)
September 2001 dummy -0.0227 (0.0557) -0.0145 (0.0557) 0.0026 (0.0547)
December 2001 dummy -0.0129 (0.0667) -0.0091 (0.0665) -0.0708 (0.0681)
March 2002 dummy -0.2801*** (0.0616) -0.2771*** (0.0624) -0.3229*** (0.0617)
June 2002 dummy -0.2490*** (0.0692) -0.2429*** (0.0693) -0.2539*** (0.0679)
Kargi location dummy -0.1163 (0.0902) -0.1282 (0.0985) -0.1191 (0.1349)
Logologo location dummy 0.0659 (0.0845) 0.0369 (0.0905) 0.2030* (0.1228)
North Horr location dummy -0.0240 (0.0892) 0.0193 (0.0924) 0.1062 (0.1356)
Suguta Marmar location dummy 0.0742 (0.0863) 0.0512 (0.0944) 0.1525 (0.1167)
Normalized family size 0.0042 (0.0148) 0.0005 (0.0148)
# adult male -0.0105 (0.0199) 0.0086 (0.0197)
H-hold head dummy (1 if male) -0.0126 (0.0427) -0.0272 (0.0436)
Age hhold head -0.0138 (0.0101) -0.0067 (0.0100)
Age hhold head squared 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Head years education 0.0175 (0.0257) 0.0202 (0.0261)
Head years education squared -0.0005 (0.0022) -0.0004 (0.0022)
Crops harvested dummy 0.2646** (0.1022)
Currently have bank account dummy 0.1540*** (0.0581)
Concern: pasture for animals 0.0691 (0.0799)
Concern: water for animals -0.0165 (0.0692)
Concern: animal sickness/death 0.1329 (0.0830)
Concern: animal theft/raiding -0.0479 (0.0854)
Concern: Insecurity/violence/fights -0.1213 (0.0835)
Concern: Human sickness -0.0539 (0.0826)
Concern: No buyers for animals 0.0795 (0.1018)
Concern: Low prices for animals -0.1698* (0.1015)
Concern: Not enough food for ppl 0.0247 (0.0726)
Concern: High prices for purchases -0.1181 (0.1008)
Concern: Crops fail -0.0516 (0.0678)
Proportion of largestock in herd 0.2364** (0.1120)
Kids away at school (dummy) -0.0156 (0.0377)
Constant 0.3685*** (0.0424) 0.3664*** (0.0451) 0.3944*** (0.0905) 0.6628** (0.2635) 0.4740 (0.3071)
Observations 353 304 304 298 298
chi2 7.5467 7.8912 53.332 61.421 94.113
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: TLU-weighted Her￿ndahl.
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